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H5N1 HPAI OUTBREAKS IN THE UK 2021/2023

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL OVERVIEW AND BIOSECURITY LESSONS FROM AVIAN INFLUENZA

HPAI WORKSHOP - OTTAWA

29 March 2023

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Overview

1. The epidemiological findings from the 2021-2023 UK HPAI outbreaks
2. Our thoughts on:
 - Biosecurity and outbreak prevention
 - Contingency planning for outbreak resilience



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Putting things in perspective



5,000 to 10,000
infectious doses



Survival time in the
environment 4 – 12 weeks





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The epidemiological findings from the 2021- 2023 UK HPAI outbreaks



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Wild bird surveillance positive cases 2020-2022

15th October 2020 –
30th September 2021




28th October 2021 –
15th September 2022



Map to show location of confirmed premises and density of poultry - AIV 2022/01

OFFICIAL




28th October 2021 –
15th September 2022





Wild bird positives across GB

Figure 1: Wild bird HPAI H5N1 positives across Great Britain 2020 to 2021 and 2021 to 2022 seasons. The asterisk denotes an increase in surveillance sensitivity in England.



GB Poultry cases 2021/2022 season

Total number of IPs
152


Total number of birds dead or culled
3.17M

England
134

Scotland
11

Wales
7


Epidemic curve: number of poultry IPs by week




Year ● 2021 ● 2022



Number of IPs by purpose




Number of IPs by species



Number of IPs by flock size



Number of commercial IPs by production type



GB Poultry cases 2022/2023 season

Total number of IPs
174


Total number of birds dead or culled
5.06M

England
148

Scotland
21

Wales
5


Epidemic curve: number of poultry IPs by week from 1 October 2022




Year ● 2022 ● 2023




Number of IPs by purpose




Number of IPs by species



Number of commercial IPs by production type



Number of IPs by flock size



Wild bird cases 2022/2023 season

Most recent wild bird collection date in the dataset

14 March 2023


828

Number of wild bird cases


56

Number of species


Epidemic curve: No. of wild bird cases by collection week from 1 Oct 22




Number of wild bird cases by Order



- Order**
- Anseriformes
 - Accipitriformes
 - Charadriiformes
 - Galliformes
 - Falconiformes
 - Columbiformes
 - Strigiformes
 - Suliformes
 - Passeriformes



Top ten wild bird species with HPAI detections (full list of species on page 5)



Comparison of the two recent poultry seasons

Number of IPs by confirmation date from 1 Oct 2021





Season 2021/22

152

Number of IPs

Epidemic curve: No. IPs by week from 1 Oct 21





Season 2022/23


174

Number of IPs

Epidemic curve: No. IPs by week from 1 Oct 22



Season ● 2021 ● 2022






GB poultry outbreaks compared with previous years

Outbreak Year 1:

- 26 October 2021 - 30 September 2022
 - Total: 158 cases
 - 134 in England
 - 7 in Scotland
 - 11 in Wales
 - 6 in Northern Ireland

Outbreak Year 2:

- 1 October 2022 - 15 November 2022
 - Total: 121 cases
 - 111 in England
 - 6 in Scotland
 - 3 in Wales
 - 1 in Northern Ireland






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Outbreak prevention and biosecurity

Big change in thinking is needed - The infection is “falling from the sky” so “inner shell” is important





Most significant new biosecurity observations

(1) a significant management event




- A high proportion of the current IPs have had a significant management event just before our high risk source window
- Therefore not a high-priority tracings
- These are events with a large number of movements in and out of the building, such as thinning, vaccinating, weighing, bedding.
- These gangs are not tracings in the conventional sense
- We do not think they are bringing infection in from another premises
- The evidence is that they are bringing infection into the buildings from the curtilage surrounding the inner shell



(2) Airborne spread

- H5 HPAIV RNA detected
- Infectious virus detected
- H5 HPAIV RNA Negative
- No infectious virus detected



Most important risk factors / pathways to focus on

- Attracting wild birds – **mossy roofs and ponds**
- The entrance door:
 - **Reduce the number of movements** in and out
 - **Shed specific PPE**
- The **curtilage** of buildings
- Maintenance failures:
 - **Water ingress** – leaking roofs and flooding events
 - Ventilation systems - netting
 - Building damage e.g. storms
- **Bedding management**
- **Rodents and wild birds** in buildings
- **Mindset** / culture
- **Unexpected events** – sickness absence, holidays etc

Epidemiological findings relevant to biosecurity

- Infection caused by one introduction of a small amount of infection – if that has been prevented, then no infected premises.
- The small-holder backyard flocks form no part of the epidemiology of the outbreak
- Infection due to direct or indirect introduction from wild birds
- Geographical clustering is due to geographical risk from wild birds
- Apparent company clusters are due to the companies themselves being clustered - not long distant spread – genomics & tracings data
- A high proportion of free range poultry in UK
 - conflicting regulatory, consumer and market pressure for environmental enhancements e.g. trees and ponds in ranges
 - Don't make your site attractive to birds and wildlife
- Seasonal producers – turkeys and game birds with poor biosecurity and multi-purpose buildings that are hard to improve.



How to improve biosecurity?

- Regional managers are key, but need an accountable Director
 - Health and safety is a good analogy
- There is a lot of human behaviour / social science underpinning successful biosecurity:
 - Make biosecurity easy to do – coloured boots.
 - Help workers understand why it is important.
 - Understanding why people don't do it – ? language issues.
- **Important because there are many “single points of failure”**
- How do you compare to others? Benchmarking – but who does this?.
- It needs proper quality assurance as part of the business culture.
- **Who should do it?** An independent, fresh pair of eyes
 - Private Vets / Assurance schemes / Government / you?
- **How to do it?**
 - Performance payments / biosecurity contracts
 - How to do it, is a business decision – what is your acceptable level of risk?



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
This is not biosecurity





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Look after your roofs, guttering and moss





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Don't make you site attractive to wild birds and rodents





Wild birds and water bodies





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Bedding





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Fully netted straw storage with straw chopper under cover when not in use





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
Gaps around gate and absence of foot dips, flooding
standing water outside gate, that extends into the
building





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Water – flooding / standing water in yards / water bodies / coastal wetlands.





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Make foot dips easy to use





Wide gauge mesh and gaps above will allow entry of wild birds and rodents





Holes in the roof






Storm damaged wire mesh



Good vestibule, but foot dip placement could be better and unnetted gaps in polytunnel structure





Maintenance issues such as blocked guttering & leakage into buildings





Gaps around gate and absence of foot dips, But particularly flooding - standing water outside gate





Disposable boot covers (beloved of management) can give a false sense of security





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Outbreak resilience and contingency planning



Contingency planning for outbreak resilience

1. Need to take measures to both **reduce the impact** of becoming an IP (contingency plan), **as well as the likelihood** of becoming an IP.
2. Understand **what will happen to you in an outbreak** before it happens – designation of hatcheries.
3. **Think about the co-location of critical infrastructure** – feed mills, hatcheries, egg stores, cutting plants etc..
4. **Record keeping for tracings – good records reduce the impact:**
 - YOU HAVE TO PROVE WHAT YOU HAVEN'T DONE
 - ALL visitors, mortality, feed, water, bird movements for at least 3 months
 - In electronic format
 - Must be complete and legible with contact phone numbers.
5. **Licencing - needs evidence** of ability to comply with conditions
6. **Run a company exercise**
7. Agree a **single point of contact** in the company for each activity
8. Provide an **on-site pack of information.**



Summary of key points

Epidemiological investigation is still showing:

1. Introduction of disease has been characterised by **single introduction events often small doses.**
 2. The majority of IPs are due to **direct or indirect introduction from wild birds.**
 3. There is **rarely spread between premises:**
 1. Except where they were part of the same business.
 2. There is no long-distance spread.
 3. There has been no disease in compartments.
- The need for a **controlling mind** to be accountable for biosecurity.
 - **Human behavioural science is important – make it easy to do the right thing**
 - David Brailsford's aggregating **marginal gains** across the business
 - **The importance of the hard shell being at the level of the shed.**
 - The particular importance of e.g. **bedding management, leaking roofs, flooding, etc.**
 - The need to **review the business, and contingency plan** – what if? E.g. cutting plants on site or adjacent.



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